Measures of political ideology are central to a broad range of political science scholarship. However, despite extensive evaluation of the relative characteristics of vote based ideology measures, little scholarship examines their validity independent of legislator behavior. Ideological validity is overlooked because all existing measures are action-based. To address this gap, this paper applies an instrumental variables technique called FILTER to assess the validity of two important measures of legislator ideology-NOMINATE and interest group ratings. The measure is also applied to investigate whether action based ideology measured suffer from agenda bias. The results show that the measures produce valid estimates of legislator ideology. Moreover, FILTER offers an important alternative to existing action-based measures of ideology which may be inappropriate for use in some settings, such as when the dependent variable being studied is also action-based.
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INTRODUCTION
Measures of political preferences are integral to the study of political phenomena.
As these measures have become more widely applied, their characteristics are increasingly studied (Carson & Oppenheimer, 1984; Shaffer, 1989; Smith, Herrera & Herrera, 1989; Hall & Grofman, 1990; Van Doren, 1990; Jackson & Kingdon, 1992; Brunell, Koetzle, Dinardo, Grofman, Feld, 1999; Desposato, 2001; Lebo, 2001) . Most commonly, measures of preference are action-based. The term 'action-based' refers to those preference measures that are based on legislators' visible, purposive behavior, such as their public speeches or roll call votes (e.g. Poole & Daniels, 1995; Poole & Rosenthal, 1997; Hill, Hannah & Shafquat, 1997) . Concerns about the accuracy of these measures arise because the issues that legislators choose to speak about or cast votes on, are not a random sample of the issues on which legislators have preferences, but are selected to improve their public standing (e.g. Snyder, 1992; Reeher, 1996) . Legislators advertise and take public positions to enhance their election prospects (Mayhew 1974) .
One consequence of this strategic position taking is that legislators and party leaders avoid publicly addressing hard issues (Arnold, 1990; Reeher, 1996) . Indeed, so rare is the advocacy of extreme or unpopular policy that when it occurs, it stands out. 1 Legislators' ability to avoid addressing extreme issues presents scholars with a measurement problem. Action-based measures may mislead analysts by causing them to believe legislators are more moderate than they actually are. Making matters worse, identifying the degree to which this occurs is difficult since all available measures of preference are action-based. Consequently, it is difficult to examine the accuracy of these measures. This paper examines the validity and nature of action-based measures of preference using a new measure of legislators' private ideology based on legislators' background characteristics rather than their purposive behavior. Use of this measure, called FILTER, to study measures of preference shows that action-based scores are valid measures of preference. This paper begins by discussing the characteristics of action-based measures of legislator preference. Next, I select two action-based measures for evaluation. Then I define and describe a new measure of legislators' private id eology that is not based on purposive behavior, and can thus be used to evaluate the accuracy action-based measures.
Using this new measure, I examine the external validity of the scores. The results show that both NOMINATE scores and adjusted interest group ratings produce valid estimates of legislators' preferences. I conclude with a brief discussion of the applicability of various types of measures of legislators' preferences.
MEASUREMENT CHARACTERISTICS
Action-based measures of legislator preferences come in three general types.
Interest group ratings gauge the positions taken by legislators on issues an interest group deems important. Groups select about 20 roll call votes on which they rate legislators.
Friends of the group are given high scores, while opponents are clumped together at the bottom (Fowler, 1982; Brunell, Koetzle, Dinardo, Grofman & Feld, 1999) . In contrast, spatial modeling techniques like NOMINATE scores avoid selection bias by including all votes with enough variation in the outcome to help improve the model fit. Spatial estimates are accompanied with the option of generating approximate standard errors, and can account for multiple policy dimensions (Poole & Rosenthal, 1997) . Measures based on legislators' public speeches as suggested by Jackson & Kingdon (1991) , and developed by Hill, Hannah & Shafquat (1997) comb through newspaper coverage of legislators' public statements in the period preceding their initial election. This technique is similar to ones used to estimate jud icial ideology (e.g. Segal & Cover, 1986 ). Despite differences in construction, these measures share an important characteristic. As actionbased measures they all use legislators' purposive behavior to construct their scores.
Two Measures: NOMINATE and Adjusted ADA Scores
Research suggests that while most action-based measures of preference are related, there is a great deal of variation across types of measures (Burden, Calderia & Groseclose, 2000) . Thus, the appropriateness of any particular measure likely depends on the purpose for which it is being used. For purposes of this work examples are needed that are either unique in their attributes, or widely used. The ideal measures of preference for this study are DW NOMINATE and adjusted interest group ratings. NOMINATE scores are far and away the most commonly used measure of legislator ideology.
2 NOMINATE scores are more objective than other measures that are based on smaller samples of votes, since they are based on all roll call votes on which mo re than 2.5% of legislators disagreed (Poole & Rosenthal, 1997) . The large number of votes allows NOMINATE to avoid some of the adverse characteristics of other preference measures.
Action based measures have been criticized for several reasons. In particular, the small number of items and the use of speeches and writings to construct ratings present several problems. First, they result in measures that are coarse, thereby assigning many legislators the same score. Second, using a subset of all events introduces sampling error.
Measures based on a small number of events may inappropriately sample from the universe of all public behavior. As with interest group ratings, the events are often selected for some particular purpose. This results in a biased sample and ultimately a biased measure. 3 Interest group ratings also lack an obvious method to assess their Brunell, Koetzle, Dinardo, Grofman, Feld (1999) demonstrates this bias. They find that interest group ratings poorly discriminate against those with whom they disagree. 4 Since this limitation has substantially hindered the examination of the influence of institutional preferences across chambers and over time, it constitutes an important contribution, and thus merits examination along NOMINATE scores.
raw interest group scores, approximate standard errors are easily calculated. 5 While the estimates these authors develop are based on the ratings of Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) the procedure is widely applicable to the ratings of any interest group.
To test the validity of the adjus ted interest group rating methodology, I evaluate the validity of adjusted ADA scores. ADA scores are well known and widely applied.
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They have also been widely criticized (e.g., Jackson & Kingdon, 1992) . Consequently, use of ADA scores provides both a difficult test for the adjustment methodology and an important barometer on a measure about which a great deal is known.
In sum, these measures are selected for evaluation because of their wide use, and value in addressing important research questions. Insight into the characteristics of these measures promises to help a large number of scholars better understand an important aspect of their work.
FILTER
In order to independently evaluate the accuracy of action-based preferences, a benchmark that is not action-based is needed. Measures of legislators' preferences are typically evaluated through comparison with other measures. For example, Burden, Calderia and Groseclose (2000) , examine the characteristics of measures based on newspaper accounts of politicians' public statements by comparing a wide variety of measures. Comparing interest group ratings, Brunell, Koetzel, Dinardo, Grofman and Feld (1999) find that interest group ratings discriminate poorly against individuals with whom the group disagrees. Shaffer (1989) argues that ADA scores nicely summarize congressional behavior. Other scholars examine the efficacy of these measures in various practical applications (e.g. Snyder, 1990; Herron, 1999) .
These studies provide insight to the relative efficacy of preference measures.
However, precisely because these measures are action-based, they do not independently assess their validity. Such measures might be highly related only because they are all influenced by the same lurking variable. In order to gain leverage to address this problem, a new measure of legislator preference is needed; one that is based on something other than legislators' purposive behavior. In the next several paragraphs I describe a method that overcomes the issues limiting action-based measures.
Historically, scholars have used models of individual behavior and background characteristics to forecast individual or group behavior (e.g. Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1947; Petrocik, 1991; Jackson & King, 1989) . This process is similar to opinion simulation (e.g. Seidman, 1975) . Recently, this general method has been applied to forecast legislators' ideology (Bishin, 2001 ). The methodology, called FILTER, relies on use of an individual's background characteristics to predict their ideology. This paper applies the FILTER methodology to evaluate NOMINATE and adjusted interest group ratings.
Research shows that numerous factors influence an individual's ideology (see for example, Converse, 1964) . One way to measure ideology independent of legislators' purposive behavior is by estimating a statistical model that predicts an individual's ideology. The three step FILTER process is as follows. First, a model predicting ideological self-placement is estimated on elites, a group for who m ideology is known, 6 ADA scores are calculated by rating legislators according to the percentage of the time they vote for the ADA's preferred position on the 20 or so bills they deem as most important in each chamber.
and extrapolated to legislators. Elites are an excellent forecast group because they share elected officials high levels of political sophistication. 7 Second, data is collected on the background characteristics of the forecast group-in this case legislators. Third, the FILTER estimates are calculated by applying the coefficients from step one to the data from step two and solving for the dependent variable. The process is substantively similar to the two-stage auxiliary instrumental variables procedure developed in Franklin to other studies, which examine only convention delegates. Additionally, this is the only study for which data is available on the important variables at appropriate levels of analysis. 8 Several models were run to identify the characteristics that best predict elite ideological self-placement. However, to ensure that the results are not an artifact of the 1984 Party Elites sample, validation of these results is crucial.
7 Indeed, legislators are generally recruited from among political elites. Further, the term political elites is usually defined as those who share high levels of political sophistication (e.g. Zaller, 1992 Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) observation that political ideology has been onedimensional and stable since the late 1960s. 11 For an extensive review and explanation see Bernstein (1989) . Also see Krehbiel (1993) . Levitt and Snyder's (1999) discussion of convergent validity (Campbell & Fiske, 1959) .
The basic idea is that if two concepts measure the same thing then they should be statistically closely related. I begin by examining the relationship between FILTER and NOMINATE in the House and Senate. I then focus on the relationship between FILTER and inflation adjusted ADA scores. If these action based ideology measures are valid then they should be statistically related to FILTER, which has itself been validated independently. I conclude with an investigation of the influence of bias in measures of preference.
NOMINATE
The external validity of NOMINATE is examined by comparing NOMINATE to FILTER. To do this, I generate FILTER scores for the 100th U.S. Congress (1987) (1988) . 12 To examine their relationship, FILTER scores are regressed on NOMINATE.
Then I examine plots of the relationship across chambers.
--Insert Table 1 --
The first two columns of Table 1 show the results of bivariate regressions of FILTER on NOMINATE scores for the 100th House and Senate. The results are striking in their similarity. In both chambers, the effect of NOMINATE on FILTER is highly statistically significant. Further, the size of the effect is virtually identical across chambers. A one unit increase in NOMINATE corresponds to a 1.58 unit increase for
House members, and a 1.59 unit increase for Senators. The measures correlate at about .9 in each chamber. Across chambers, the only difference between the models is in the 12 The formula from which these estimates are generated is seen in Appendix A.
size of the standard errors, which may be attributable to differences in sample size.
However, the nuances are seen in the plots of the relationship between these variables.
--Insert Figure 1-- The relationship between NOMINATE and FILTER for the 100th House is seen in Figure 1 . The scatterplot confirms the strong positive relationship described in Table1.
The plot is interesting on several levels. 
Adjusted Interest Group Ratings
Following the procedure applied above, this section examines the validity of the adjusted interest group rating procedure. I begin by regressing FILTER on Adjusted ADA scores for the 100 th House and Senate. I then examine the plots of this relationship across chambers.
The second two columns of 
A Comment on Agenda Bias
One criticism of action-based measures of preference is that they are biased (e.g.
Londregan, 2000)
. Theoretically, such allegations are not surprising and are undoubtedly correct. It is important to keep in mind that ideology, as theoretical construct does not easily lend itself to measureme nt. It seems unlikely that scholars will ever be able to incorporate all of the influences on ideology in a preference measure. Action-based measures leave out a wide range of observable behavior, including that which occurs in committee and on the campaign trail. Private ideology measures like FILTER are subject to the same omitted variable bias problem when data is unavailable to measure the impact of variables thought to influence an individual's ideology.
Nonetheless, the data presented here allow for a preliminary investigation into the question of whether agenda bias influences interest group ratings (Snyder 1992 ). To examine this we can look at the pattern of residuals for the regression of FILTER on NOMINATE for the 100 th House. The House is the appropriate chamber for study because the effects of agenda bias should be stronger here due to majority party control over the agenda via the rules. NOMINATE scores are examined because they account for the largest number of votes among preference measures, providing an almost complete snapshot of the agenda. Figure 5 shows a scatterplot of NOMINATE on the residuals for FILTER for the House. If no bias exists, then we should see a random pattern to the residuals in Figure 4 .
Analysis of this plot shows systematic variation from the random 'shotgun' type blast we would expect from random error.
--Insert Figure 16 Figure 5 shows that this is clearly not the case. Instead, these plots suggest that the relationship between FILTER and NOMINATE varies within parties. Indeed, were we to take absolute values of the residuals, we would see that within parties, the increased conservatism on NOMINATE is positively associated with increased prediction error.
Consequently, it is likely that these systematic differences between what we observe and expect are likely due to other factors such as constituency characteristics or the influence of special interests.
DISCUSSION
Overall these results suggest that both measures produce valid estimates of legislator preference. Unsurprisingly, and consistent with Londregan's (2000) formal work, the plots suggest that some bias exists. Since this work does not account for the numerous influences on legislator behavior we cannot draw definitive conclusions about the source of the systematic variation we observe. In sum, while both measures seem to generally 'predict' legislator ideology correctly, there is some systematic variation in the error component. However, it appears that this variation is not a product of agenda bias.
The results show that the regression model slightly under predicts for liberals and over predicts for conservatives. This result is contrary to the expectation resulting from agenda bias (e.g. Snyder 1992), which implies that party leaders seek to make their members look moderate. Instead, the issues brought to a vote make legislators look more extreme than they we predict. Importantly, this pattern is visible across chambers and is thus unlikely to be the product of gerrymandering.
One explanation for this pattern might be that legislators appeal to subconstituencies for electoral support (Fenno 1978; Wright 1989; Bishin 2000) . If legislators propound the position of intense district minorities instead of those of apathetic dis trict majorities then their voting preference might be more extreme than their personal preferences.
The FILTER procedure offers the potential for advances in a wide range of studies for which adequate ideology measures do not exist. Indeed, because FILTER is based on a strong theory of ideological formation, the measure is widely generalizable.
Ideology estimates and standard errors can be calculated for any group of political elites for whom background data is available. Scholars' ability to estimate ideology is no While the measure seems to discriminate less well among members who are ideologically close, this is a product of the underlying score and not the adjustment procedure.
Consequently, these results demonstrate this measure is valid as well.
The results depicted herein also speak to the validity of FILTER as a measure of ideology as well. Internally, FILTER correlates highly with elite attitudes over time.
Externally, FILTER is closely associated with House Members ideological self-placement. Moreover, if we turn the analysis around, and take NOMINATE and interest group ratings as independent and valid measures of ideology, then the close association between FILTER and these measures can also be seen as providing evidence for FILTER's validity.
A central implication of this research is that there is no single best measure of ideology. It is inherently difficult to identify which measure best represents something that is intangible.
Consumers should consider the characteristics of these measures when deciding which to use in their research. While NOMINATE has a number of desirable properties, adjusted interest group ratings may be more appropriate for applications where preferences must be comparable across chambers or time. In cases in which political behavior is unobservable or behavior based measures need to be avoided, FILTER provides an appropriate measure of ideology.
The development and application of this measure is extremely important because prior to its inception, action-free measures of ideology did not exist. Consequently, FILTER scores provide an alternative for scholars that need an action-free independent variable for use in studying politicians' behavior. While the precise specification of the FILTER model may vary, preliminary results suggest the model presented herein is very stable over at least short periods of time. 
Bootstrapped estimates are recovered by adding the bias of the observed coefficient. Bias is calculated by subtracting the bootstrap coefficients form the observed coefficients depicted above (in Appendix B). Standard errors are for the bootstrapped values. (N) indicates the confidence interval using the assumption that the statistic is normally distributed. (P) indicates the vales between which 95% of the estimates in the bootstrap sampling distribution were observed.
